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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
C.E. BUTTERS OR BETTY BUTTERS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
v. 
TINA JACKSON and 
KELLY NORTON, 
Defendants/Appellants• 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTION 
In its decision filed May 9, 1996, this court reviewed 
language in a residential lease between the parties which provided: 
Furniture, fixtures and personal property of tenant may 
not be removed from the premises until rent or other 
charges are fully paid. 
This court affirmed the trial court decision and found the language 
established a contractual lien and a security interest in all of 
the tenants' property, including exempt property, justifying the 
landlords' retention of the property (and an assumed future right 
to sell or otherwise dispose of the property). The decision upheld 
the trial court's finding that the landlords need not follow Utah 
Code §78-36-10.5, the eviction statute. 
This ruling went far beyond Utah precedent and was done 
without the benefit of briefing on this issue. The decision is 
likely to have a serious impact on thousands of Utah renters who 
will unwittingly and unintentionally lose their personal property 
1 
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based on a document they thought was only a lease, not a lien 
agreement. For the reasons discussed herein, the court should 
rehear the issue, should reconsider its decision and issue a 
revised decision disallowing hidden and unintentional liens in 
rental agreements. 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
Did the Utah Court of Appeals misapprehend the Utah common law 
regarding contractual liens and Article Nine of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) by declaring the lease term "FURNITURE, 
FIXTURES AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE TENANT MAY NOT BE REMOVED 
FROM THE PREMISES UNTIL RENT OR OTHER CHARGES ARE FULLY PAID" a 
valid contractual lien and a security interest? 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE LEASE LANGUAGE DID NOT CREATE A CONTRACTUAL LIEN 
This court erred in finding that the Butters-Jackson lease 
contained a contractual lien on all of the tenants' personal 
property to secure payment of rent. While correct in citing 
Citizens Bank v. Elks Blda.,N,V,, 663 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1983) for 
the proposition that parties may by contract establish a lien to 
secure payment of rentf that case held that a contractual lien 
agreement must: (1) "identify the property to be charged, and (2) 
make clear that the lien is to secure payment of the debt in 
question." The Court then cited a number of cases as examples; 
however, each of them specifically and expressly provides that a 
"lien" is granted in some property. This actually formed the basis 
for the holding in that case: no contractual lien existed where the 
2 
lease simply said that if the tenant was in default, all of their 
property became the landlord's. This language is similar to the 
present case# where the landlords, with the blessing of the trial 
court, have seized and held all of the tenants' property and can 
presximably sell or retain it. Citizens Bank requires the opposite 
result here. 
Other cases have held that the language creating a lien must 
state clearly an intention to do so and some have required "strict 
proof" of such an intention to create a lien. See Cherno v. Dutch 
American Mercantile Corporation, 353 F.2d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 1965); 
Wellbro Building Company v. McConnico, 421 P.2d 837, 839 (Ok. 
1966): 
In order that a lien may be created by a contract, 
express or implied, it is generally necessary that the 
language of the contract or the attendant circumstances 
should clearly indicate an intention of the parties to 
create a lien on the specific property, and should show 
a specific charge on or appropriation of, that property; 
and if it is intended to create a lien at the time of the 
execution of the contract, the words creating the lien 
should be in praesenti. 
(quoting 53 C.J.S. Liens § 2(b) p. 835). 
3 
The language in the Wellbro lease * illustrates what is 
required to show the parties' clear intention to create a lienf and 
clearly authorizes seizure and sale of the tenant's property. Such 
language is notably absent here. 
Even the summarizing language of the court in Frisco Joes, 
Inc. v. Peav, 558 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1977), which never quoted 
the actual lease language, was more specific, and provided that, 
"any unpaid rent would be a lien against any of plaintiff's 
personal property, which was not to be removed until all rent was 
paid."(emphasis added). In contrast, the language here does not 
even contain the word "lien," nor does it specifically identify any 
property. This court should not supply terms to create a lien when 
the circumstances do not show a clear intent by the parties to do 
so, especially when the unintended result of such a lien is the 
loss of all rights to exempt property. 
B. THE JACKSON LEASE DID NOT CREATE A SECURITY INTEREST 
1. No valid security agreement exists. 
While the common law governing contractual liens requires 
intention and specificity for a lien to be established, that 
1
. The lease language creating the lien provided: 
... Lessee waives all right of exemption from 
sale or seizure under distress or execution 
that he now or hereafter has by virtue of any 
law exempting personal property from seizure 
and sale and hereby gives lessor full power, 
authority and right to take and seize any 
personal property, whether exempt by law or 
not, and sell the same or any part in 
satisfaction of said rent and damages. 
Wellbro Building Company, 421 P.2d at 839. 
4 
requirement comes from another source as well: Article 9 of the 
UCC. As will be seen in the following discussion, the Butters-
Jackson lease fares poorly when analyzed as an Article 9 security 
agreement.2 
Under the law of secured transactions, a security interest can 
be created by a security agreement. Thus, the Code provides: 
'Security agreement' means an agreement which creates or 
provides for a security interest. 
Utah Code § 70A-9-105(l)(1). In this case the only document that 
could be a security agreement is the lease. Therefore, that lease 
must be reviewed to determine whether it meets all the requirements 
of a security agreement under Article 9.3 
The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the "creates or provides 
for" terminology of UCC § 9-105 as requiring "language specifically 
granting a security interest in collateral." Pontchartrain State 
Bank, 684 F.2d at 706. 
2
. A security agreement must be interpreted against the 
party that drafted it; in this case, the landlords. In re Greives, 
81 B.R. 912, 952 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987). 
3
. The Tenth Circuit has noted that traditionally a security 
agreement is contained in a separate security instrument. However, 
some courts have construed other documents, such as promissory 
notes or financing statements, as security agreements if they 
otherwise satisfy the requirements of Article 9 and contain 
language creating or providing for a security interest. 
(Citations omitted). 
Pontchartrain State Bank v. Poulson, 684 F.2d 704, 705 (10th Cir. 
1982). 
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There is no language in the Butters-Jackson lease which comes 
close to satisfying the requirements of Article 9 for the creation 
of a security interest• The words "grants," "security interest" or 
"security agreement" do not appear anywhere in the lease. The 
reason for this is simple: the parties never intended to create an 
Article 9 security agreement. If the parties did not so intend, 
the court should not create such an agreement by supplying missing 
terms or by liberally interpreting the language of the lease so as 
to find a security agreement. 
2. No enforceable security agreement exists because the 
description of the property is inadequate. 
Even assuming arguendo that the language passes the § 9-105 
test for granting a security interest, it fails a further crucial 
test under Utah Code § 70A-9-203. This section of Article 9 
provides, in relevant part, that a security interest is not 
enforceable unless three elements exist: 
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured 
party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a 
security agreement which contains a description of the 
collateral . . .; 
(b) value has been given; and 
(c) the debtor has rights in the collateral. 
Utah Code § 70A-9-203(l). In this case, the tenants had rights in 
the collateral 4 and "value" in the form of the leasehold had been 
given. It is the first requirement that presents an insurmountable 
4
. At least in the property that the tenants owned at the 
inception of the lease. The problem of an apparent grant of a 
security interest in as yet unacquired items, in violation of the 
UCC, is discussed later in this section. 
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obstacle to the lease being treated as a security agreement. 
First, the tenants' property was not in the landlords' possession 
pursuant to agreement. Therefore, to satisfy Utah Code § 70A-9-
203(1)(a) the lease must contain a description of the collateral 
that is sufficient under Article 9. 
The designation of the collateral as "furniture, fixtures and 
personal property" is not a sufficient description for Article 9 
purposes. Utah Code § 70A-9-110 provides: 
For the purposes of this chapter any description of 
personal property or, except as otherwise required by 
Subsection (1) of Section 70A-9-402 relating to the 
contents of a financing statement, real estate is 
sufficient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably 
identifies what is described. 
By its own terms this definition precludes an argument that the 
term "personal property" is a sufficient description of collateral. 
By using the phrase "any description of personal property" as the 
opening premise of Section 9-110, the drafters of Article 9 were 
declaring that personal property must be described in a security 
agreement. Otherwise, the section is illogical. 
There is virtually uniform agreement in the case law that the 
term "personal property" is insufficient for describing collateral 
in a security agreement. In In re Boogie Enterprises. Inc.. 866 
F.2d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir. 1989) the court reviewed whether a 
reference to "personal property" in a financing statement5 was 
5
. A financing statement is used to perfect a security 
interest created by a security agreement. Utah Code § 70A-9-302. 
A financing statement is sufficient if, among other things, it 
"contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the 
items, of collateral." Utah Code § 70A-9-402(l). As discussed in 
First National Bank v. First Security Bank of Montana, 721 P.2d 
7 
sufficient to perfect a security interest in settlement proceeds. 
The court held that it did not, concluding: 
The weight of authority indicates that financing 
statements under the Uniform Commercial Code must 
describe collateral with greater precision than that 
furnished by the term "personal property." 
A number of other courts have reached the same conclusion: See, In 
re Fuoua, 461 F.2d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 1972) (the phrase "all 
personal property" was insufficient to perfect a security interest 
in livestock, feed, and farming equipment); In re H.L. Bennett, 588 
F.2d 389, 392 (3d Cir. 1978) (the phrase "all assets as contained in 
the security agreement" was too vague to satisfy §9-402); Lehigh 
Press, Inc. v. National Bank of Georgia, 389 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. App. 
1989)(the phrase "all personal property" failed to indicate the 
types or describe the items of collateral in which a security 
interest was taken); Becker v. Bank of Barron, 53 B.R. 450 (W.D. 
Wise. 1985)(the phrase "all farm personal property" approached the 
"super-generic and did not reasonably identify the collateral); 
Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Halberstadt, 425 N.W. 2d 429 (la. App. 
1988). 
1270, 1273 (Mont. 1986), the written description of collateral 
serves different purposes in the security agreement and the 
financing statement. 
Because of the differing purposes, it is generally agreed that 
the description of collateral requirement for security agreements 
is stricter than for financing statements.Landen v. PCA of 
Midlands, 737 P.2d 1325 (Wyo. 1987); State v. Woodward, 675 P.2d 
1007, 1010 (N.M. App. 1983) ("Because the security agreement 
identifies the items of collateral, greater particularity is 
required than in the financing statement."). 
8 
The In re Boogie court concluded: 
We agree with the analysis of those courts and of 
Professor Gilmore. Section 70A-9-402's requirement of 
identification by "types" or "items" obliges the drafter 
of a financing statement to designate the collateral for 
a loan with greater specificity than the language 
"personal property" provides. "Personal property" 
encompasses all of the items—including general 
intangibles, among others—covered by the division of the 
Code regulating secured transactions. (Citation 
omitted). The term refers to essentially everything that 
a creditor can perfect an interest in pursuant to the 
Code. "Personal property" cannot satisfy § 9402 's 
requirement of identification of assets by "types" or 
"items" because "personal property" refers to no more and 
no less than every kind of collateral perfectible under 
the statute. 
If the language "personal property" were sufficient 
to perfect a security interest, creditors would never 
need to use any other language to designate collateral. 
(Emphasis in the original). 
In re Boogie Enterprises, 866 F.2d at 1174-75. Given their 
different purposes, and the generally more lenient approach to 
language describing collateral in a financing statement, the 
court's condemnation of the term "personal property" supports a 
fortiori the rejection of "personal property" as a sufficient term 
for describing collateral in a security agreement. 
Related to the issue of a sufficient description of the 
collateral under § 9-203 is the issue of after-acquired property. 
Article 9 permits the parties to secure an obligation by after-
acquired collateral but that agreement must be stated in the 
agreement. Utah Code § 70A-9-204. In this case, there is no such 
statement in the lease, yet the trial court, and this court's 
initial opinion, allowed the landlord to seize and hold all 
property in possession of the tenants at the end of the lease, 
without any concern about whether some or all of the property 
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allegedly pledged to secure the rent was even present or in the 
possession of the tenants at the outset of the lease. 
It should be clear that questions about what property was 
after-acquired cannot be answered, because the language which the 
court found to create a security interest is simply too broad and 
nondescriptive. Acceptance of the terms "furniture, fixtures and 
personal property" as satisfying § 9-203 plays havoc with well-
established principles of law developed under Article 9 and gives 
a blank check to landlords which could be easily abused to the 
detriment of innocent tenants. 
C. THE LEASE TERM PURPORTING TO GIVE LANDLORDS A SECURITY 
INTEREST IS UNCONSCIONABLE 
The UCC at Utah Code §70A-2-302 prohibits unconscionable terms 
in a contract. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
unconscionability includes the absence of a meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. Bekins Bar V Ranch 
v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). 
The tenants signed the landlords' lease during a severe 
housing shortage. At the time in question, there was a severe 
shortage of available housing in the Ogden, Weber County area. The 
tenants had no choice regarding what terms would be included in the 
lease because of the tight housing market and the form contract 
that was provided. The subject paragraph was just another of a 
typical boiler-plate, closely printed lease agreement that favored 
the owner. For example, the lease term was for nine months and 21 
days, yet the owner, in addition to holding the tenants' personal 
10 
property for nonpayment of rent or other charges, could terminate 
the lease, for any reason, ". . . with 10 days written 
notice. . . . " 
To claim that the tenants had a meaningful choice in signing 
a lease that contained the subject clause during a tight housing 
market is to strip Bekins Bar V of its intended meaning. Jackson 
had no meaningful choice when she affixed her signature on the 
Butters lease. The subject clause contained in the lease should, 
therefore, be declared unconscionable. 
D. ALLOWING UNINTENDED SECURITY AGREEMENTS IN LEASES WHICH 
ALLOW THE SEIZURE OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS VIOLATES IMPORTANT 
PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES 
In P.H. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah 1991), the court 
allowed waiver of the implied warranty of habitability only with a 
separate signed disclosure, requiring an express waiver for public 
policy reasons. The same should be true here. Before a tenant 
gives up rights to personal property, including exempt property, it 
seems reasonable that such waiver be express, clear, separately 
signed, if not barred altogether. Here there is simply no 
indication that such a waiver was intended at all, yet this court 
enforced it, allowing landlord to seize and hold all of tenants' 
property, solely based on the "contractual lien." This would seem 
to violate the public policy set forth in P.H. v. Oliver. 
Another indicator of the "wrong road" the initial decision 
leads to is found in the regulations of the Federal Trade 
Commission. The FTC's Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Credit 
Practices, 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4), prohibits non-possessory, non-
11 
purchase money security interests in consumers' household goods. 
This regulation declares it an unfair act or practice for a lender 
or retail seller directly or indirectly to take or receive from a 
consumer an obligation that: 
constitutes or contains a nonpossessory security interest 
in household goods other than a purchase money security 
interest. 
Household goods includes: "clothing, furniture, appliances, 
one radio and one television, linens, china, crockery, kitchenware, 
and personal effects (including wedding rings) of the consumer and 
his or her dependents . . ."16 C.F.R. § 444.l(i). These are 
exactly the kind of items that were seized and held with the lower 
court's blessing here. While the FTC Rule applies to finance 
companies, credit unions, retailers and others, it does not 
directly apply to landlords. The policy objectives it set out to 
achieve are directly impacted here, however. As one treatise put 
it: 
While the collateral has little economic value as 
collateral, the FTC has found that the threat of 
repossession . . . of such goods provides creditors with 
a powerful psychological lever. In fact, the FTC claimed 
in the early 1980's that threats of repossession of 
household goods security may have been the single most 
common form of creditor harassment. 
. . . The FTC has found that these threats cause great 
emotional suffering, anxiety, guilt and distress, leading 
to illness and strain on family relations. . . . 
National Consumer Law Center, Repossessions and Foreclosures 
(3d ed. 1995), at 100. The public policy should lead to a 
prohibition or strict reading of similar clauses in Utah leases, 
not the blanket approval this court gave such clauses in its 
initial opinion. 
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CONCLUSION 
By finding a contractual lien and an unintended security 
interest, the court has departed both from recognized UCC law and 
Utah public policy concerning leases. In addition to resolving an 
issue that has great public importance in residential leases and 
providing a seeming end-run around a relatively new statute, these 
issues were not briefed or argued. Rehearing should be granted to 
argue these issues. While a valid intentional security agreement 
and contractual lien may be included in a lease, this court's 
broad, sweeping approval of the vague and unintended clause here 
will result in frequent seizures of tenants' property, increased 
litigation around such clauses and seizures, failure to follow the 
eviction statute and a bad public policy which could extend to UCC 
cases. Rehearing should be granted to fully develop and resolve 
these issues. 
Martin S. Blaustein, as attorney for the Appellants, certifies 
that he submits this petition in good faith and not for delay. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this X& day of \jut~~£L~ 
1996. 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
MARTIN S/ECAtiiSTEIN 
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